ARTICLE
Biomethane: does "more expensive" Polish gas pay off more than imports?
Price is not the full bill — 5 takeaways from the Polish Biomethane Association report that change how we should judge biomethane economics versus imported natural gas.

One parameter often dominates the energy-transition debate: the unit price of gas per MWh on the wholesale market. It is an important benchmark, but from a macroeconomic perspective it should not be the only criterion. When comparing imported natural gas with domestic biomethane, the right question is not only "how much does an MWh cost?" but also: where does the fuel money go?
Imports mean money flowing abroad and exposure to FX, supply availability, geopolitics and price volatility. Domestic biomethane production — even at a higher unit price — can create economic activity at home, jobs, public revenue and greater security of supply.
The Polish Biomethane Association (POB), in its report "Comparative analysis of the macroeconomic effects of natural-gas imports vs domestic biomethane production" by Dr. Bartosz Moszowski, analyses this for a volume of 1 bcm per year — about 10.16 TWh of chemical energy. The conclusion is conditional but important: biomethane can be more favourable for the economy than imports if the supply chain stays largely domestic and the financing mechanism is well designed.
Five takeaways that show why biomethane should be assessed not just against TTF prices, but also against the trade balance, the local value chain and security of supply.
1. Import intensity, not just price, drives the economic effect
The POB analysis does not deny that price matters. It does, however, show that unit price alone is not enough to judge economic effects. Import intensity is decisive — how much of the biomethane value chain rests on foreign technology, components, services or capital.
The report captures this with a lambda (λ) indicator: the share of imported components in total supply-chain value. In practice this includes imported equipment and technology, certain materials and services, plus the potential repatriation of profits by foreign entities.
The lower the import intensity, the more spending stays in the country. That is why biomethane should not be judged purely as a fuel that is more expensive than natural gas. From an economic standpoint, what matters is whether the higher unit cost recirculates in the domestic economy or flows abroad.
In the report's base case, anchored on the 2024 EU wholesale price of 35 EUR/MWh, the import-intensity threshold λ* is 27.4%. That means at a reference biomethane price of PLN 545/MWh, domestic production improves the external balance versus imports when the share of imported components stays below that level.
The report also runs an updated variant at 47 EUR/MWh (~PLN 200.83/MWh). This is a test variant, not a new annual average, but it shows how results shift at higher TTF prices: the threshold λ* rises to 36.9%. In other words, the costlier the imported gas, the higher the share of imported components the biomethane chain can absorb while still helping the external balance.
That shifts the debate. The question is no longer just: is biomethane more expensive than natural gas? It is rather: how local is the biomethane value chain, and how much of the spending stays in the Polish economy?
2. The real question is not how much we pay, but who we pay
The most important difference between gas imports and domestic biomethane production is not simply the MWh price. In the import scenario, much of the fuel payment leaves the domestic economy. In the biomethane scenario, the higher cash flow can feed a domestic value chain: agriculture, logistics, transport, operations, services, digestate handling and parts of domestic industry.
Per POB's calculation for 1 bcm/year in the base case, imported gas costs ~PLN 1.52bn a year. Biomethane at the reference price of PLN 545/MWh implies a total annual flow of ~PLN 5.54bn. At first glance the gap is large — biomethane is markedly more expensive in unit terms.
But what matters economically is where the money ends up. In one of POB's variants — at λ = 0.20, a moderate share of imported components — those imports account for ~PLN 1.11bn leaving the country, while the remaining ~PLN 4.43bn is domestic gross economic activity. Under that assumption, the larger share of biomethane production value stays in the domestic economy.
That is the heart of the report. "More expensive" biomethane can be better for the economy than "cheaper" imports — not because price stops mattering, it does, but because price is not the whole bill. When a higher fuel cost converts into domestic income, services, jobs, taxes and supply-chain demand, its economic impact is different from a payment for an imported commodity.
In that sense, biomethane is not just an energy product. It is also a mechanism for keeping value at home. The more local the supply chain, the stronger the effect.
3. Biomethane can create an investment impulse, jobs and public revenue
Growing the biomethane sector means building real production capacity: fermentation plants, biogas upgrading, grid connections, storage, logistics and service infrastructure. That is not just fuel spending — it is an investment stimulus.
POB estimates that building a portfolio capable of producing 1 bcm of biomethane a year would require capex of around PLN 4.52–10.13bn. The range reflects different benchmarks for hitting the production target at European scale; the report treats it as an order of magnitude, not a specific project cost.
Assuming 30% of capex is imported, the domestic capex component would be ~PLN 3.16–7.09bn. This is why biomethane matters beyond the energy market — it also matters for construction, engineering, equipment manufacturing, automation, services, maintenance and engineering consulting.
Operational effects are equally important. Per data cited in the POB report, the full biomethane value chain can generate roughly 700–1,050 jobs per 1 TWh of annual output. For 1 bcm (~10.16 TWh) that translates to roughly 7.1–10.7 thousand jobs.
These figures are orders of magnitude, not precise employment forecasts. They depend on the breadth of the domestic supply chain, the share of local services, market maturity and project organisation. But the direction is clear: domestic biomethane production drives demand for labour and skills in sectors that, in the import scenario, do not develop to the same extent.
Fiscal impact matters too. The report notes biomethane production can generate several streams of public revenue: personal and corporate income tax, VAT on domestic capex and opex, local taxes and fees, and indirect effects from broader economic activity. In the import scenario, the bulk of the fuel-related economic value leaves the domestic economy.
4. The more expensive imports get, the more the domestic supply chain matters
POB shows the relationship between imports and biomethane shifts with the European gas price. The higher the import price, the larger the share of imported components the biomethane chain can absorb while still improving the external balance.
At 35 EUR/MWh the threshold is 27.4%. At 40 EUR/MWh it rises to 31.4%, at 50 EUR/MWh to 39.2%, and at 60 EUR/MWh to 47%. In the updated 47 EUR/MWh variant the threshold is 36.9%.
In practice this means that, with more expensive imports, the economic case for domestic biomethane becomes easier to defend — but not automatically. It still requires lower import intensity, i.e. building domestic technological, service, design and operational capabilities.
This is a key takeaway for industrial policy. If biomethane growth rests mainly on imported technology, equipment, services and capital, part of the economic effect is diluted. If domestic competences grow with the market — component manufacturing, design, operations, service, logistics, technical advisory and the farming base — biomethane can become a tool for building domestic value added.
It also means support mechanisms for biomethane should not be designed only as a fuel subsidy. They should also reinforce the domestic supply chain, so public support is not just covering the price gap with natural gas but building competences that stay in the economy.
5. Biomethane reduces import risk, but needs well-designed support
Imported gas may be cheaper in a given year, but its cost and economic attractiveness depend on factors the domestic economy has little control over: TTF prices, FX, geopolitics, supply availability and regulatory risk. For users covered by EU ETS, costs of buying and surrendering CO₂ allowances also matter — not as a direct part of the import price, but as part of the total cost of using gas in those installations.
Domestic biomethane production does not eliminate all risks. Biomethane projects still face cost, regulatory, technology, feedstock and logistics risks. They need a stable feedstock base, efficient permitting, grid connections, financing and predictable revenue mechanisms.
The difference is that some of those risks change in character. Instead of full exposure to imported fuel, the domestic economy gains a distributed production model based on local feedstock, local logistics and a domestic operational base. Biomethane can therefore improve system resilience — not because it is risk-free, but because it cuts external dependencies.
The report also flags that PLN 545/MWh should not be read as a single market price for biomethane, nor as a universal cap. It is a reference point for the fixed-price purchase and negative-balance mechanism within a specific support scheme — and, for larger plants, an analytical benchmark.
From a macro perspective, the key question is therefore how to design support so it does not just finance a more expensive fuel, but builds lasting economic effects. If support rewards low import intensity, a stable feedstock base, local anchoring and high domestic competence content, it can strengthen both energy security and domestic value added.
Summary: a more expensive fuel does not always mean a higher cost for the economy
POB's central insight is more nuanced than the simple "cheap imports — expensive biomethane" framing. Unit gas price matters but does not exhaust the economic calculation. Imports mean money flowing abroad and exposure to external risks. Domestic biomethane production can strengthen the external balance, the domestic value chain, employment, public revenue and security of supply — provided import intensity is moderate and support is well designed.
So the biomethane economics question should not be only: "how much does an MWh cost?". Equally important: how much spending stays in the domestic economy, which risks we reduce, where jobs are created, and whether we are building domestic technology, design, service and operational competences in the biomethane market.
In that frame, biomethane is not a simple replacement for imported gas. It is part of industrial policy, energy security and the circular economy. It may be more expensive per MWh, yet more favourable in the macroeconomic ledger.
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